Indicators of Risks to Media Pluralism

The 12 Indicators of Risks to Media Pluralism aim to take stock of the health of the media sector in Montenegro by assessing three dimensions of risk: economic, legal, and political. How concentrated is the media market, and why can it not be properly calculated in Montenegro? What are the greatest risks to Media Pluralism? How well set are the legal and institutional frameworks?

Media Audience Concentration

Result: High risk

This indicator aims to assess the concentration of audience and readership across media platforms based on audience share. Concentration is measured by using the nationwide biggest 4 owners in the market. 

Why?

The risk of audience concentration in Montenegro is assessed as high, due to inconsistency or lack of audience data per horizontal market.

In Television:

Telekom Crna Gore together with IPSOS and Nielsen, measure the Television audience, through the system called Ariana, however that is proprietary information, which is not accessible to the public. MOM Team was able to use the data for sampling purposes, i.e. to select the most viewed, hence potentially the most influential television stations in the country. However, the measurement system does not include all the TV stations in the MOM sample, making it impossible to calculate the concentration in the market. Furthermore, the lack of a unified measuring system presents a high risk for pluralism in the market; it makes it difficult for the regulator and other stakeholders to gauge influence and the concentration in the market.

In Print, Radio and Online: There is no system of audience measurement in the remaining media markets. Measurement of audience ratings is important as they influence content produced for the viewers.

The lack of audience data is considered a HIGH risk to Media Pluralism.

LOW MEDIUM HIGH
Audience concentration in Television (horizontal)

Percentage: missing data

If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have an audience share below 25%. If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have an audience share between 25% and 49%. If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have an audience share above 50%.
Audience concentration in Radio (horizontal)

Percentage: missing data

If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have an audience share below 25%. If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have an audience share between 25% and 49%. If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have an audience share above 50%.
Readership concentration in newspapers (horizontal)

Percentage: missing data

If within one country the major 4 Owners have a readership share below 25%. If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have a readership share between 25% and 49%. If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have a readership share above 50%.
Audience concentration in Internet (horizontal)

Percentage: missing data

If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have an audience share below 25%. If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have an audience share between 25% and 49%. If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have an audience share above 50%.

Media Market Concentration

Result: No data

This indicator aims to assess the horizontal ownership concentration based on market share which illustrates the economic power of companies/ groups. Concentration is measured for each media sector by adding the market shares of the major owners in the sector. 

Why?

The Market data, revenue data on horizontal markets, is not consistently available which makes the calculation of concentration in horizontal markets impossible. However the financial data on legal entities is available through Portal Taxis, the website of the Tax and Customs administration of Montenegro

LOWMEDIUMHIGH
Media market concentration in television (horizontal): This indicator aims to assess the concentration of ownership within the TV media sector.
Percentage: not assessed
If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have a market share below 25%. If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have a market share between 25% and 49%. If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have a market share above 50%.
Media market concentration in radio (horizontal) : This indicator aims to assess the concentration of ownership within the Radio media sector.
Percentage: not assessed
If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have an audience share below 25%. If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have an audience share between 25% and 49%. If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have an audience share above 50%.
Media market concentration in newspapers (horizontal): This indicator aims to assess the concentration of ownership within the print sector.
Percentage: not assessed
If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have a market share below 25%. If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have a market share between 25% and 49%. If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have a market share above 50%.
Media market concentration in Internet Content Providers
Percentage: not assessed
If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have a market share below 25%. If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have a market share between 25% and 49%. If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have a market share above 50%.

Regulatory Safeguards: Media Ownership Concentration

Result: High Risk

This indicator assesses the existence and effective implementation of regulatory safeguards (sector-specific and/or competition law) against a high horizontal concentration ownership and/or control in the different media. 

Why?

Even though the Electronic Media Law in Montenegro contains some concentration regulation and regulatory safeguards they appear to be insufficient and inadequate. The Electronic Media law defines concentration through a number of licenses and the share of capital and distinguishes between legal and illegal concentration. So the law stipulates the existence of concentration when a broadcaster

1) participates in the founding capital of another broadcaster, a legal entity that publishes a daily print media or a legal entity that performs the activities of an information agency or vice versa;

2) Simultaneously holds more than one broadcasting license;

3) Simultaneously broadcasts both radio and television programs;

4) Simultaneously broadcasts radio and/or television programs and publishes daily print media distributed in the area where the radio and/or television program is broadcasted;

5) Simultaneously broadcasts radio and/or television programs and engages in the activities of information agencies.

Furthermore, it specifies that media concentration exists when the founders of a broadcaster are individuals or legal entities who are simultaneously:

1) founders of another broadcaster;

2) founders of a legal entity that publishes a daily printed media that is distributed in the area where the radio or television program is also broadcasted;

3) founders of the information agency;

4) Spouses, extramarital partners, or relatives up to the second degree of kinship in the direct or collateral line of the individuals from the previous points.

Article 132 of the Electronic Media Law stipulates that illegal media concentration exists when a broadcaster:

1) who has license for broadcasting with national coverage:

  • Participates in the share capital of another broadcaster that holds such a license with more than 25% of the capital or voting rights.

  • Participates in the share capital of a legal entity publishing daily print media with a circulation of more than 3,000 copies, with more than 10%, or vice versa,

  • Participates in the share capital of a legal entity that performs the activity of an information agency with more than 10%, or vice versa

  • Simultaneously publishes daily print media with a circulation of more than 3,000 copies;

2) Apart from the national public broadcaster, broadcasts more than one television and one radio program with the same or similar program basis in the same area;

3) a radio or television program that has broadcasting license with local or regional coverage:

4) participates in the share capital of another broadcaster with regional or local coverage in the same area with more than 30%

 

5) Simultaneously, in the same or in neighboring areas, publishes a daily printed media of local character.

In relation to the conflict of interest with regard to family members, it is prescribed that an illegal media concentration will be considered to exist when in cases referred to in Article 132 of the Law, a natural person who is the founder of a broadcaster or a person related to them in the direct line up to the second degree of kinship or the spouse of the founder participates in the share capital of another broadcaster, the founder of a daily print medium, or a information agency, exceeding the established amount of the share capital.

Furthermore, there are no regulatory safeguards to effectively prevent concentration in the print and online markets. It appears also that regulatory safeguards against a high horizontal concentration of ownership and control in the media sector through merging operations is not adequate to meet the specific challenges of the Montenegrin media market.

Regulatory Safeguard Score:

9.5 out of 20 = High Risk (47,5%)

1 = media-specific regulation/ authority

0.5 = competition-related regulation/ authority

TELEVISIONDescriptionYesNoNAMD
4.1Does the media legislation contain specific thresholds or limits, based on objective criteria (e.g. number of licenses, audience share, circulation, distribution of share capital or voting rights, turnover/revenue) to prevent a high level of horizontal concentration of ownership and/or control in this sector?This question aims to assess the existence of regulatory safeguards (sector-specific) against a high horizontal concentration of ownership and/or control in the TELEVISION sector.2
4.2Is there an administrative authority or judicial body actively monitoring compliance with the thresholds in the audiovisual sector and/or hearing complaints? (e.g. media and/or competition authority)?This variable aims to assess if the law/regulation provides a due monitoring and sanctioning system for the regulation on audiovisual media concentration.2
4.3Does the law grant this body sanctioning/enforcement powers in order to impose proportionate remedies (behavioural and/or structural) in case of non-respect of the thresholds?

The variable aims at assessing if the law is providing a due system of sanctions to sector-specific regulation, such as:

  • Refusal of additional licences;
  • Blocking of a merger or acquisition;
  • Obligation to allocate windows for third party programming;
  • Obligation to give up licences/activities in other media sectors;
  • Divestiture.
2
4.4Are these sanctioning/enforcement powers effectively used?This indicator aims to assess the effective implementation of sector-specific remedies against a high horizontal concentration of ownership and/or control in the television media. 
1
Total:

                   7 out of 16

MEDIA MERGERSDescriptionYesNoNAMD
4.17Can a high level of horizontal concentration of ownership and/or control in the media sector be prevented via merger control/competition rules that take into account the specificities of the media sector?

This question aims to assess the existence of regulatory safeguards (sector specific and/ or competition law) against a high horizontal concentration of ownership and/or control in the media sector through merging operations. For instance, the law should prevent concentration in merging operations: 

-By containing media-specific provisions that impose stricter thresholds than in other sectors;

 -The mandatory intervention of a media authority in merger and acquisition cases (for instance, the obligation for the competition authority to ask the advice of the media authority);

 - The possibility to overrule the approval of a concentration by the communication authority for reasons of media pluralism (or public interest in general)); -that - even though they do not contain media-specific provisions - do not exclude the media sector from their scope of application.

MD
4.18Is there an administrative authority or judicial body actively monitoring compliance with rules on mergers and/or hearing complaints? (e.g. media and/or competition authority)?This variable aims to assess if the law/regulation provides a due monitoring and sanctioning system.1
4.19Does the law grant this body sanctioning/enforcement powers in order to impose proportionate remedies (behavioural and/or structural) in case of non-respect of the thresholds?

The variable aims at assessing if the law is providing a due system of sanctions to sector-specific regulation, such as: 

  • Blocking of a merger or acquisition;
  • Obligation to allocate windows for third party programming;
  • Obligation to give up licences/activities in other media sectors;
  • divestiture.
1
4.20Are these sanctioning/enforcement powers effectively used?This indicator aims to assess the effective implementation of sector-specific remedies against a high horizontal concentration of ownership and/or control in the television media.

Low risk: the relevant authority effectively uses its sanctioning powers in all the relevant cases.

Medium risk: the authority's powers are not always used in all the relevant cases.

High risk: the relevant authority never uses its sanctioning powers

Total:                       2.5

Cross-media Ownership Concentration

Result: High Risk

This indicator aims to assess the concentration of ownership across the different sectors – TV, print, audio, and any other relevant media – of the media industry. Cross-media concentration is measured by adding up the market shares of the Top 8 media companies. The results are not an indicator for economic strength in different media sectors but rather for the potential influence on public opinion when considering all media types.

Why?

The risk of cross-media ownership concentration in the Montenegrin media market appears to be high. So top 8 companies in the market reach a market share of 89.50%. These are the National Public Broadcaster, RTCG, with presence in television, online and radio markets, which alone has a market share of 48%, Jumedia Mont (Dan), Daily Press, Televizija Vijesti, Nova Pobjeda, Podgorica local Broadcaster (Gradska TV), AST (Prva TV) and Nova M. However, when looked at top groups or owners the market share is even higher.

So the top 4 Groups/Owners have a market share of 87.56% and these are:

Publicly funded media (RTCG + Gradska) - 53.49% (Television, Radio, online)

United Group (Vijesti + Nova M) - 17.35% (Television, Print, online)

Dan Group (Jumedia mont + Radio D plus) - 8.83% (Print, radio online)

First Financial Holdings (Pobjeda group + CDM + Portal Analitika) - 7.88% (print, online)

LOW (1)MEDIUM (2)HIGH (3)
3Percentage: 87.56%
If within one country the major 8 owners (Top8) have a market share below 50% across the different media sectors. If within one country the major 8 owners (Top8) have a market share between 50% and 69% across the different media sectors.If within one country the major 8 owners (Top8) have a market share above 70% across the different media sectors. 

Central registry for business entities in Montenegro
Portal Taxis, Website of the Tax and Customs administration of Montenegro

Regulatory Safeguards: Cross-media Ownership Concentration

Result: Medium Risk

This indicator aims to assess the existence and effective implementation of regulatory safeguards (sector-specific and/or competition law) against a high degree of cross-ownership between media types (press, TV, radio, internet). Given the diversity of thresholds or limits that exist among different countries with regard to ownership and/or control, 'high' should be assessed according to the standards of your country and in the light of the thresholds or limits imposed by domestic laws.

Why?

The Montenegrin Electronic Media Law defines illegal concentration which attempts to tackle cross-media ownership by limiting capital or number of licences for national and regional broadcasters, however, practice is showing that these limitations are easily circumvented. The law regulates at the level of licence holding legal entities, however, in the market, owners are not limited from setting up creative or numerous legal entities which would allow them to operate with additional licences. So for example, United Group through a set of legal entities with a complex ownership structure fully controls national Television broadcaster Nova M, but also holds 51% ownership in another national Television broadcaster Televizija Vijesti and 51% in the daily newspaper Vijesti (with circulation 3661 on 23 November 2023) and the online media Portal Vijesti (which is the most visited online media in the country).

Article 132 of the Electronic Media Law stipulates that illegal media concentration exists when a broadcaster:

1) who has licence for broadcasting with national coverage:

  • Participates in the share capital of another broadcaster that holds such a licence with more than 25% of the capital or voting rights.

  • Participates in the share capital of a legal entity publishing daily print media with a circulation of more than 3,000 copies, with more than 10%, or vice versa,

  • Participates in the share capital of a legal entity that performs the activity of an information agency with more than 10%, or vice versa

  • Simultaneously publishes daily print media with a circulation of more than 3,000 copies;

2) Apart from the national public broadcaster, broadcasts more than one television and one radio program with the same or similar program basis in the same area;

3) a radio or television program that has broadcasting licence with local or regional coverage:

  • participates in the share capital of another broadcaster with regional or local coverage in the same area with more than 30%,

  • Simultaneously, in the same or in neighbouring areas, publishes a daily printed media of local character.

In relation to the conflict of interest with regard to family members, it is prescribed that an illegal media concentration will be considered to exist when in cases referred to in Article 132 of the Law, a natural person who is the founder of a broadcaster or a person related to them in the direct line up to the second degree of kinship or the spouse of the founder participates in the share capital of another broadcaster, the founder of a daily print medium, or a information agency, exceeding the established amount of the share capital.

Regulatory Safeguard Score: 6 out of 8 – Medium Risk (Regulation: 75%)

CROSS-MEDIA OWNERSHIPDescriptionYesNoNAMD
5.1Does the media legislation contain specific thresholds, based on objective criteria, such as number of licences, audience share, circulation, distribution of share capital or voting rights, turnover/revenue, to prevent a high degree of cross-ownership between the different media?This indicator aims to assess the existence of regulatory safeguards (sector-specific and/or competition law) against a high degree of cross-ownership in different media sectors.1
5.2Is there an administrative authority or judicial body actively monitoring compliance with these thresholds and/or hearing complaints? (e.g. media authority)This variable aims to assess if the law/regulation provides a due monitoring and sanctioning system for the regulation on audiovisual media concentration.1
5.3Does the law grant body sanctioning/enforcement powers in order to impose proportionate remedies (behavioural and/or structural) in case of non-respect of the thresholds?

The variable aims at assessing if the law is providing a due system of sanctions to sector-specific regulation, such as:

  • Refusal of additional licences;
  • Blocking of a merger or acquisition;
  • Obligation to allocate windows for third party programming;
  • Obligation to give up licences/activities in other media sectors;
  • divestiture.
1
5.4Are these sanctioning/enforcement powers effectively used?

the relevant authority never uses its sanctioning powers

The question aims at assessing the effectiveness of the remedies provided by the regulation.


0.5
5.5Can a high degree of cross-ownership between different media be prevented via merger control/competition rules that take into account the specificities of the media sector?

For instance, cross-ownership can be prevented by competition law: 

- by the mandatory intervention of a media authority in M&A cases (for instance, the obligation for the competition authority to ask the advice of the media authority);

 - by the possibility to overrule the approval of a concentration by the competition authority for reasons of media pluralism (or Public interest in general);

Even though the law does not contain media-specific provisions - it does not exclude the media sector from its scope of application

1
5.6Is there an administrative authority or judicial body actively monitoring compliance with these rules and/or hearing complaints? (e.g. media and/or competition authority)This variable aims to assess if the law/regulation provides a due monitoring and sanctioning system for the regulation against a high degree of cross-ownership in different media sectors via merger control/competition rules0
5.7Does the law grant body sanctioning/enforcement powers in order to impose proportionate remedies (behavioural and/or structural) in case of non-respect of the thresholds?

Examples sanctioning/enforcement powers and remedies: 

- blocking of a merger or acquisition;

 - obligation to allocate windows for third party programming; 

- must carry obligation to give up licences/activities in other media sectors;

- divestiture.

5.8Are these sanctioning/enforcement powers effectively used?The question aims at assessing the effectiveness of the remedies of the regulation.0.5
Total (Mean of L-e und L-I sub-indicators)                  6

Media Ownership Monitor Montenegro - Legal Assessment

Ownership Transparency

Result: Medium Risk

This indicator assesses the transparency of data about the political affiliations of media owners as ownership transparency is a crucial precondition to enforce media pluralism.  

Why?

Active transparency means company/channel informs proactively and comprehensively about its ownership, data is constantly updated and easily verifiable. MOM investigated a sample of 38 outlets and 31 companies. 18 outlets and 13 companies were ranked as Actively Transparent, i.e. 45% of the entire sample.

Passive Transparency means that upon request, ownership data is easily available from the company/from a channel. No media outlet or company were ranked passive transparent.

Data publicly available means ownership data is easily available from other sources, e. g. public registries etc. 13 outlets and 10 companies were ranked as Data Publicly Available, i.e. even if the websites didn’t inform them public of the owners those could be found in the public records such as the Central Registry of Business Entities of Montenegro, this transparency ranking was used in 33% of cases.

Data unavailable means ownership data is not publicly available; company/channel denies the release of information or does not respond, no public record exists. 10% of the entire sample was ranked as Data unavailable. In 3 outlets and 4 companies some key data was unavailable in Montenegro.

Active disguise means in addition to unavailability of true data, ownership is disguised, e. g. through bogus companies, or proxy ownerships etc. 4 outlets and 4 companies were ranked active disguise, representing 12% of the entire sample.

LOW (1)MEDIUM (2)HIGH (3)
TRANSPARENCY
6.1How would you assess the transparency and accessibility of data about the media ownership?

Data on media owners as well as their political affiliations is publicly available and transparent.

(Active Transparency)

Code if that applies to >75 % of the sample.

Data of media owners and their political affiliations are disclosed based on investigations of journalists and media activists or upon request.

(Passive Transparency, Data Publicity Available)

Code if that applies to >50% of the sample.

Data on political affiliation of media owners are not easily accessible by the public and investigative journalists or activists are not successful in disclosing these data. 

(Data Unavailable, Active Disguise)

Code if data is available for < 50% of the sample.

Regulatory Safeguards: Ownership Transparency

Result: Low Risk

This indicator aims to assess the existence and effective implementation of transparency and disclosure provisions with regard to media ownership and/or control.

Why?

The Montenegrin legal framework provides safeguards on ownership transparency through two sets of laws: Law on Media and the Law on Electronic Media, the latter regulating the audiovisual media.

According to the Law on Media, media founders/publishers must disclose information on the ownership structure. The Law also envisages a misdemeanor fee between 1000 and 8000 Euros for any legal entity which does not allow direct and constant access to all private and legal entities that own more than 5% of the capital in media, but also information on affiliated entities.

The Law on Electronic Media provides more detailed stipulations for TV and radio stations. regarding the publication of the ownership structure. In addition to providing information on the ownership structure, the broadcasters are obligated to report in writing the change in ownership structure to the Agency for Electronic Media, the regulatory body that monitors the adherence with the law.

For any change in the broadcaster's ownership structure of more than 10% participation, the broadcaster must obtain the prior written consent of the Council of the Agency.

Furthermore, a domestic legal entity whose founders include foreign legal entities registered in countries where it is not possible to determine the origin of the founding capital cannot be holder of a license. If, after the license is issued, it is determined that one of the co-owners of the broadcaster is a foreign legal entity registered in a country where the origin of founding capital cannot be determined, the license will be revoked.

Hence, the regulatory safeguards on disclosure of ownership transparency present a LOW RISK in Montenegro.

Regulatory Safeguard Score: 4.5 out of 5 – Low Risk (90%)

Transparency ProvisionsDescriptionYes +No -NAMD
7.1Does national (media, company, tax...) law contain transparency and disclosure provisions obliging media companies to publish their ownership structures on their website or in records/documents that are accessible to the public?The aim of the question is to check regulatory safeguard for transparency towards the citizens, the users and the public in general. 1
7.2Does national (media, company, tax...) law contain transparency and disclosure provisions obliging media companies to report (changes in) ownership structures to public authorities (such as the media authority)?The aim of the question is to check regulatory safeguard for accountability and transparency towards public authorities.1
7.3Is there an obligation by national law to disclose relevant information after every change in ownership structure?This question aims at assessing if the law provides rules on the public availability of accurate and up-to-date data on media ownership. This is a condition for effective transparency.1
7.4Are there any sanctions in case of non-respect of disclosure obligations?This question aims at assessing if the law on media ownership transparency can be enforced through the application of sanctions.1
7.5Do the obligations ensure that the public knows which legal or natural person effectively owns or controls the media company?This question aims at assessing the effectiveness of the laws that deal with media ownership transparency and if they succeed in disclosing the real owners of the media outlets.Medium: some owners are still unknown
Total (Mean of L-e und L-I sub-indicators)                   4.5

Legal Assessment - Media Ownership Monitor Montenegro (2023)

Political Control Over Media Outlets

Result: High Risk

This indicator assesses the risk of political affiliations and control over editorial independence of newsrooms. It also assesses the level of interference by politically affiliated actors in the work of news media.

Why?

According to the most recent European Commission’s Report for 2023, Montenegro has a pluralistic and diverse media landscape. However, it is noted that the media environment is still highly polarised, with uneven application of the Journalistic Code of Ethics and professional standards.

The polarization line among media was clearer and more visible until the second half of 2020, when Montenegro changed a 30-year-long ruling of the Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS) and its former leader and former President of Montenegro, Milo Đukanović, which was de-facto controlling all institutions, including the National Public Broadcaster RTCG. Until the Parliamentary elections of August 2020, media were divided between those pro-governmental, supporting DPS policies, and those pro-critical, whose editorial policy was strongly against the ruling regime.

For example, the media owned by Petros Stathis, a Greek businessman with Montenegrin citizenship, and who publicly claimed friendship with Đukanović, were publicly accused to have a pro-government editorial policy. However, since the 2020 DPS transfer to the opposition, they cannot be considered pro-government anymore. They now have a critical editorial policy towards the Government and the ruling majority, who are political opponents of the DPS and previous regime. This includes Pobjeda, Portal Analitika and CDM.

At the same time, National Public Broadcaster RTCG was a mouthpiece for the previous ruling regime, until 2021, when the new management was appointed. While the management itself is faced with severe allegations regarding the legality of their appointment, all relevant stakeholders note that RTCG now produces balanced content, including in the election periods.

On the other hand, several of the most influential and trusted media in Montenegro were often accused of working against the Government. Minority owners of Vijesti - Miodrag Perović and Željko Ivanović were constantly accused by several political parties of pursuing their own political agenda, favoriting particular political parties. This is the reason why DPS, for several years, boycotted TV programs, and a similar case was with the former Democratic Front, which now participates in the Government. Similarly, Dan was also accused of anti-DPS editorial policy. However, due to their critical reporting, Vijesti and Dan faced severe consequences - Dan’s editor-in-chief Duško Jovanović was assassinated in an attack that has still not been resolved for almost 20 years. Vijesti’s owner was beaten, and several journalists were severely attacked, including journalist Vijesti Olivera Lakić, who was attacked - twice. A bomb was thrown on the editorial of Vijesti, while several of their cars were burnt. Weekly Monitor continues to maintain their pro-critical editorial policy towards any government.

Media critical of governments from 2020 onwards also faced several verbal and physical attacks. However, the complete resolution of cases of attacks on journalists and media represents one of the key problems when it comes to the freedom of speech.

Also, several Montenegrin media have been owned or controlled by structures affiliated with the Serbian ruling regime and its president Aleksandar Vučić. Due to those links, these media have a favorable editorial policy towards the former Democratic Front, currently For the Future of Montenegro - a pro-Serbian coalition controlled by the Speaker of the Parliament Andrija Mandić, and Milan Knežević, leader of the other party that forms this political block. Due to strong relations of this political block with the Serbian ruling establishment, an affiliation with several media in Montenegro has been made, including TV Prva, Adria TV, Srpska radio televizija, Pink M, also portals Borba and IN4S.

In addition – the political affiliation of several other media is perceived by the public on different sides. For example, radio and portal Antena M is perceived to have a pro-critical editorial policy towards the current Government and supportive towards the previous regime, while A Plus TV is very critical towards the previous regime, as its de-facto owner Duško Knežević flipped sides, escaped to UK, and stopped the support to the DPS when they tried to indict him.

Also, TV7, local public broadcaster Gradska, and TVE are also perceived to be critical towards the current government and supportive of the previous regime due to the close ties their key persons have with the DPS and its leadership.

However, due to constant political crises, regular changes in the composition of the ruling majority, and sometimes blurry lines between the Government and the opposition, since 2020, it is hard to determine the clear line of division in media purely based on those criteria.

Score: 2.86 (High Risk)

LOW (1)MEDIUM (2)HIGH (3)
POLITICISATION OF MEDIA OUTLETS
8.1

What is the share of TV media owned by politically affiliated entities?

The media having <30% audience share is owned (controlled) by a specific political party, politician, or political grouping, or by an owner with specific political affiliation.The media having <50% >30% audience share is owned (controlled) by a specific political party, politician, or political grouping, or by an owner with specific political affiliation. The media having >50% audience share is owned (controlled) by a specific political party, politician, or political grouping, or by an owner with specific political affiliation.
8.2

What is the share of Radio stations owned by politically affiliated entities?

The media having <30% audience share is owned (controlled) by a specific political party, politician or political grouping, or by an owner with specific political affiliation.The media having <50%>30% audience share is owned (controlled) by a specific political party, politician, or political grouping, or by an owner with specific political affiliation. The media having >50% audience share is owned (controlled) by a specific political party, politician or political grouping, or by an owner with specific political affiliation.
8.3What is the share of Newspapers owned by politically affiliated entities? 
The media having <30% audience share is owned (controlled) by a specific political party, politician or political grouping, or by an owner with specific political affiliation.The media having <50%>30% audience share is owned (controlled) by a specific political party, politician or political grouping, or by an owner with specific political affiliation. The media having >50% audience share is owned (controlled) by a specific political party, politician or political grouping, or by an owner with specific political affiliation.
8.4What is the share of Online News Media owned by politically affiliated entities? 
The media having <30% audience share is owned (controlled) by a specific political party, politician, or political grouping, or by an owner with specific political affiliation.The media having <50%>30% audience share is owned (controlled) by a specific political party, politician, or political grouping, or by an owner with specific political affiliation. The media having >50% audience share is owned (controlled) by a specific political party, politician, or political grouping, or by an owner with specific political affiliation.
8.5To what degree is politically affiliated ownership transparent? 
There is only limited politically affiliated ownership in the country and in all cases, the owners and their interests are disclosed to the public.The majority of politically controlled news media are transparent about their ownership and interests.The majority of politically controlled media are secretive about their ownership and interests.
8.6Are there laws that regulate conflicts of interests between media ownership and political parties, partisan groups, party members, office holders and relatives?
There is clear and effective regulation that highlights the incompatibility of political office (on the local, regional, national level) with media ownership and requires transparency in the case of other political offices.There is regulation, but only covers some politically affiliated groups (effectively).There is no regulation, or regulation is ineffective.
8.7Do politically partisan owners or other political interest systematically interfere with the editorial autonomy of newsrooms? NO DATA 
The available evidence suggests very few or no attempts at interfering with editorial autonomy.The available evidence suggests occasional interferences and/or some degree of self-censorship in newsrooms. The available evidence suggests systemic interference with editorial autonomy, which may or may not be accompanied by self-censorship in newsrooms.
8.8To what extent is editorial independence guaranteed in editorial statutes or in self-regulatory mechanisms?
Most news media in the country guarantee editorial independence in their statutes, or they subscribe to self-regulatory codes that do so.The most prestigious news media in the country guarantee editorial independence in their statutes, or they subscribe to self-regulatory codes that do so.Neither editorial statutes, nor self-regulation mentions editorial independence, or the guidelines are not respected by newsrooms.

Political Control Over Infrastructure

Result: Low Risk

This indicator assesses the political control over important infrastructural layers in the distribution, as well as in the value and supply chains of media content. It also assesses the level of discrimination in favour of politically affiliated media distribution networks. Infrastructural elements are in most cases privately owned and access is provided to news publishers for a fee.

Why?

Print Distribution: There was no evidence of discriminatory actions towards a particular media. All Montenegrin newspapers are printed by the same printing company (Daily Press - publisher of Vijesti), although they have very different editorial policies. Newspapers are being distributed by the same company, and being sold in a multitude of ways, through kiosks, markets, etc. No reports were made public that any newspaper was not able to be sold at a particular place. LOW risk

Radio Distribution: Licenses are being issued by the Agency for Electronic Media (AEM). According to the public record, no discrimination was reported with regard to the radio distribution. Considering the size of the country and population, Montenegro has a wide range of radio stations and can be considered a liberal market where it is easy to get a license permits. LOW Risk

TV distribution: Distribution of the TV signal in Montenegro occurs in two different ways - terrestrial system (MUX 1 and MUX 2) as well as through Pay-TV systems (CDS, IPTV, DTH, and DVB-T2). According to the data of AEM from June 2023, Montenegro has 35% more Pay-TV connections than households, which shows how widely accepted this distribution system is in Montenegro.

However, when it comes to TV distribution, there are several factors that raise the risk to the MEDIUM. According to the Government’s data, Operator M:Tel held the biggest share of the market - 37,22% ž. M:tel is a subsidiary of Serbian Telecom, a state-owned Serbian company. Telemach held 29,78% of the market, which is a subsidiary company of the United Group, the arch-rival of Serbian Telecom. The third operator which held 29,75% of the market, was Crnogorski Telekom, a subsidiary of the German Deutsche Telecom.

In addition, the case of the Pink M, which held national frequency in Montenegro until 2018, shows the uneven application of the standards by the AEM. Pink M, at the time strongly progovernment TV supporting the ruling DPS, had 19 accepted complaints for violation of professional standards. Although it heavily qualified for temporary and then permanent revocation of the license, this never occurred because Pink M obviously had political support within the Agency. Later, Pink M as a national broadcaster was sold to United Media and renamed into Nova M, while Pink M continued to broadcast from Serbia as a cable channel, whose content was banned several times since then by AEM.

An additional alleged discrimination case occurred in 2022. In March 2022 AEM decided not to provide a national frequency to Adria TV. While AEM claimed it was rejected based on the incomplete application, at the same time, Adria TV complained about discrimination. At the same time, other commercial TV stations with national frequency were objecting to the idea of providing additional national frequency for TV, claiming that the market is already too small and AEM should do all it can to preserve it. However, in a repeated proceeding, in October 2022, Adria TV got a national frequency.

Telekom distribution: Although key players on the market are the same as in cable distribution, no cases of discrimination were noted in public. The regulator has the capacity to act in case of discrimination. LOW risk

Advertising market: No data is available on the number of players in the advertising market or the share of the market they control. In recent history, there have been no public claims or records about discrimination in this field. LOW risk

Measurement services: The only audience measurement that exists is related to TV. Telekom Crna Gore, together with Ipsos and Nielsen, measures the Television audience through the system called Ariana; however, that is proprietary information, which is not accessible to the public. MOM Team was able to use the data for sampling purposes, i.e. to select the most viewed, hence potentially the most influential television stations in the country. Furthermore, the lack of a unified measuring system presents a high risk for pluralism in the market; it makes it difficult for the regulator and other stakeholders to gauge influence and concentration in the market. In print, radio, and online, there is no audience measurement system. HIGH risk

Score: 9/6=1.5 (Low Risk)

LOW (1)MEDIUM (2)HIGH (3)
POLITICISATION OF INFRASTRUCTURE
9.1How would you assess the conduct of the leading distribution networks for print media?
Leading distribution networks are not politically affiliated or do not take discriminatory actions.At least one of the leading distribution networks is politically affiliated or takes occasional discriminatory actionsAll of the leading distribution networks are politically affiliated and have a record of repeated discriminatory actions
9.2How would you assess the conduct of the leading radio distribution networks?
Leading distribution networks are not politically affiliated or do not take discriminatory actions.At least one of the leading distribution networks is politically affiliated or takes occasional discriminatory actionsAll of the leading distribution networks are politically affiliated and have a record of repeated discriminatory actions
9.3How would you assess the conduct of the leading television distribution networks?
Leading distribution networks are not politically affiliated or do not take discriminatory actions.At least one of the leading distribution networks is politically affiliated or takes occasional discriminatory actions All of the leading distribution networks are politically affiliated and have a record of repeated discriminatory actions
9.4How would you assess the conduct of the leading internet distribution networks?
Leading distribution networks are not politically affiliated or do not take discriminatory actions.At least one of the leading distribution networks is politically affiliated or takes occasional discriminatory actionsAll of the leading distribution networks are politically affiliated and have a record of repeated discriminatory actions
9.5How would you assess the conduct of the leading service providers in the advertising market?
There is no indication that major commercial advertising agencies / sales houses would discriminate against independent media.At least one of the leading commercial advertising agencies / sales houses discriminates against independent media due to political affiliations (despite having a significant audience share).Independent news media don’t have access to commercial advertising agencies / sales houses discriminating against independent media due to political affiliations (despite having a significant audience share).
9.6How would you assess the conduct of the leading audience measurement services?
Audience measurement services are in practice available to all relevant market players and comply with industry standards; transparency, non-discrimination, proportionality, objectivity and inclusiveness of the methodology and the service is guaranteed.At least one of the leading audience measurement services raises concerns related to transparency, non-discrimination, proportionality, objectivity, and/or inclusivenessAll of the leading audience measurement services raise concerns related to transparency, non-discrimination, proportionality, objectivity, and/or inclusiveness.

Agency for Electronic Media (2023): Report on the situation on the market of distribution of the radio and TV programs to end users Accessed in August 2023
Government of Montenegro(2021): Report on the development of market of electronic communication Accessed in August 2023
Vijesti(2017): Pink M ready for the licence revoke Accessed in August 2023

State Control Over Media Resources

Result: Medium Risk

This indicator assesses the influence of the state on the functioning of the media market, through control over public funds and resources, with an emphasis on the risk of discrimination in the distribution of state support and advertisement. The discrimination can be reflected in favouritism towards political parties or affiliates of political parties in the government, or in penalising the media criticising the government.

Why?

Montenegro has no Law defining terms and conditions of allocating state advertising. The only general law that must be followed for all public spending is the Law on Public Procurement, which prescribes various annual thresholds for specific services purchased. Therefore, if the annual value of the specific purchased services is below 20,000 euros, it is conducted in accordance with the internal regulations of the particular public institutions. For those above 20,000 euros, a tender must be published.

However, even in cases where an institution must issue a tender, it is quite easy to adjust requirements to needs of a particular media, keeping in mind Montenegro has no official audience measurement for any media format. Therefore, it is almost impossible to enforce an objective proceeding. 

However, according to the Media Law, all media and public authorities are obliged to report public spending that was directed to media for any purpose, including advertising, to the Ministry of Culture and Media.

According to the most recent report of the Ministry, covering 2022, Montenegrin media are significantly more responsible in reporting public finance than the public authorities. In 2022, a total of 62% of the registered media submitted financial information, while only 27,85% of public authorities did so. The idea of the Law for both sides being obliged to report on public funding to the media is to be able to cross-reference the data and ensure its validity. However, with the uneven practice of reporting, it is still not possible to do so or to have complete data on the public funds channelled  to the media. 

According to the data reported by the Ministry of Culture and Media, in 2022 in total, 3,61 million euros of public funds were distributed to the media, of which 928 thousand was for advertising and other media services. On the other hand, according to the public authorities’ a total of 7,59 million was given to media, of which 784 thousand was for advertising and other media services. It is unclear from the data how this was calculated, especially considering that only the annual public finance of the National Public Broadcaster RTCG goes above 17 million euros, which was obviously not included in the calculation.  

Since no data is available on the size of the advertising market in general, especially the sizes of specific parts of the market, including TV, radio, print, and online, it is impossible to calculate the participation of public funds in the overall market.The unavailability of this data potentially raises the risk of state control over media resources. 

Direct media support is prescribed by the Law on Media, which envisages the distribution of funds through the Media Diversity and Pluralism Fund, which is overall slightly less than a million euros per year. Part of the fund envisaged for print and online media is distributed by the Ministry of Culture and Media, while the other part for TVs and radios is distributed by the regulator – the Agency for Electronic Media (AEM). According to the available public information, no complaints were made about the possible discrimination in relation to the distribution of the Fund. While the Ministry distributed all funds, AEM claimed significant underspending due to a lack of applications and announced that the remaining funds would be distributed in an additional call. 

On the other hand, indirect support to media is not regulated by law but rather conducted based on the decisions of the responsible authorities. In June 2023, the Government adopted a decision, instructing each elementary and high school to buy five copies of each daily print (Dan, Vijesti and Pobjeda) during every working day. In that way, the Government wanted to support Montenegrin print media, but in a manner to avoid it being considered a state aid. No similar measures were introduced for other media formats – TV, online, or radio. In addition, for several years, the Government provided subsidies for commercial televisions to compensate for the costs of signal transmission through the terrestrial network, but again, it was based on the discretionary decision of the Government.

Montenegro does not have a state-financed news agency.

National Public Broadcaster RTCG is by far the most financially potent media in Montenegro. With a budget of over 17 million euros per year, it has more funds than all commercial TVs with national frequency, commercial radio stations, and online media altogether. Also, it has by far the most employees of all media, which exceeds 700. In November 2023 the director general of the RTCG stated that the current financing model is satisfactory. However, RTCG is facing problems in ensuring funds for digitising its archives.

The leadership of the RTCG – its Council is appointed by the Parliament of Montenegro, while the director general is appointed by the Council based on the public call. 

The Council members are appointed based on proposals that come from different structures of the society, as prescribed by the Law. This includes two representatives coming from CSOs dealing with human rights, and one representative of each of the following structures: universities from Montenegro, Montenegrin Academy of Science and Arts or association of intellectuals “Matica Crnogorska” (consecutively), national cultural institutions and CSOs in the area of culture, Montenegrin Chamber of Commerce or association of employers which are represented in the Social Council (consecutively), CSOs in the area of media, trade unions which are represented in the Social Council, Montenegrin Olympic Committee and Montenegrin Paralympic Committee (consecutively).

In the case of several applications from various entities that are entitled to propose candidates, the lack of clearance allows MPs to circumvent the spirit of the law to appoint candidates with the biggest and most credible support. 

For years, some civil society and media organisations have pointed out the politicisation of the process by the Parliament while appointing candidates, especially those from civil society. Instead of appointing ones with the highest credible support among the civil society, the Parliament went into deciding among proposed candidates which they favoured more. The European Union notes that clear safeguards are needed against any form of undue influence on the editorial, institutional or financial independence of RTCG which needs to abide by the highest standards of professional integrity and accountability.  

In addition, the EU notes in the 2023 report that In January 2023, the Podgorica Basic Court overturned the RTCG Council’s decision to appoint the public broadcaster’s Director-General as unlawful. In May 2023, this ruling was upheld, in the second instance, by the Podgorica High Court. In June 2023, the Council reappointed the same person as the RTCG Director-General, causing a strong public reaction from multiple CSOs, which accused the RTCG Council of abuse of office and failure to comply with a final and enforceable court decision.

Score: 2 (Medium Risk) 

LOW (1)MEDIUM (2)HIGH (3)
10.1Is state advertising distributed to media proportionately to their audience share? 
State advertising is distributed to the media relatively proportionately to the audience shares of media.State advertising is distributed disproportionately (in terms of audience share) to the media. State advertising is distributed exclusively to few media outlets, which do not cover all major media outlets in the country.
10.2How would you assess the rules of distribution of state advertising?
State advertising is distributed to media outlets based on fair and transparent rules.State advertising is distributed to media outlets based on a set of rules but it is unclear whether they are fair and transparent.There are no rules regarding distribution of state advertising to media outlets or these are not transparent and/or fair.
IMPORTANCE OF STATE ADVERTISING
10.3

What is the share of state advertising as part of the overall Radio advertising market?

VALUE: no data

Share of state advertising is <5% of the overall marketShare of state advertising is 5%-10% of the overall marketShare of state advertising is > 10% of the overall market
10.4

What is the share of state advertising as part of the overall Radio advertising market?

VALUE: no data

Share of state advertising is <5% of the overall market.Share of state advertising is 5%-10% of the overall market.Share of state advertising is > 10% of the overall market.
10.5

What is the share of state advertising as part of the overall Newspaper advertising market?

VALUE: no data

Share of state advertising is <5% of the overall market.Share of state advertising is 5%-10% of the overall market.Share of state advertising is > 10% of the overall market.
10.6

What is the share of state advertising as part of the overall Online news media advertising market (without amounts spent on news intermediaries)?

VALUE: no data

Share of state advertising is <5% of the overall market.Share of state advertising is 5%-10% of the overall market.Share of state advertising is > 10% of the overall market.
10.7Is direct financial support distributed fairly, transparently and based on clear rules? 
There are clear rules on the allocation of direct state subsidies and, in practice, subsidies are transparently and fairly allocated (criteria may not only be based on market share, but also public interest content, underserved communities, the need for innovation, etc.)The rules on the allocation of direct state subsidies are either not clear or the process of allocation lacks sufficient transparency or shows signs of political bias.There are no rules on the allocation of direct state subsidies and/or the allocation of subsidies is opaque and/or clearly discriminatory.
10.8Is indirect financial support distributed fairly, transparently and based on clear rules?
There are clear rules on the allocation of indirect state subsidies and, in practice, access to indirect subsidies is transparent and fair.The rules on the allocation of indirect state subsidies are either not clear or the process of allocation lacks sufficient transparency or shows signs of political bias.There are no rules on the allocation of indirect state subsidies and/or the allocation of indirect subsidies is opaque and/or clearly discriminatory.
10.9Do all media outlets have access to the state-financed news agency, and do they receive quality content relevant for their news production?
There is a state-financed news agency in the country that is accessible to all news media under the same (and fair) conditions, providing objective, well-sourced information.There are some concerns related to access to the state financed news agency or possible bias in the content provided.Access to the state-owned news agency causes unnecessary burden for some news media and/or its content is biased.
10.10Do you consider the financing of the PSM independent and adequate?
The financing of the PSM is adequate, without distorting competition with private media; and the process includes sufficient guarantees against political dependencies (e.g. through licence fees)?The financing of the PSM is insufficient or could distort competition with private media; and the funding process may enable political dependencies?The financing is insufficient to a degree that quality journalism is not or hardly possible and/or the funding process is clearly under political control.
10.11How do you assess the independence of the appointment and dismissal process of the PSM management?
There are clear rules on the appointment and dismissal of the PSM management, independence from political actors is guaranteed; and in practice appointments and dismissal decisions are made based on professional considerations.Appointment and dismissal rules of PSM management may allow for some political influence and/or the practice of appointments and dismissals shows signs of bias.Rules on appointment and dismissal of PSM management clearly enable political influence and/or appointments and/or dismissals are clearly politically motivated.

Regulatory Safeguards: Net Neutrality

Result: Medium Risk

Network neutrality is the principle that all data on networks should be treated equally by not discriminating or charging differently in terms of users, content, sites or applications. Protecting net neutrality is essential to safeguarding media diversity because it guarantees equal ability to access and disseminate information, opinions, perspectives, etc. online, which is essential to media diversity. This indicator aims to capture the landscape of legal regulation of net neutrality as well as the specific regulatory mechanisms that address net neutrality.

Why?

While the law does not define net neutrality, the issues related to net neutrality are indirectly regulated by the constitution of Montenegro, in that it:

“stipulates that there shall be no censorship in Montenegro, and that only a competent court may prevent dissemination of information and ideas via the means of public communication only if required so to: prevent the incitement to violent overthrow of the constitutionally established order; preserve the territorial integrity of Montenegro; prevent the promotion of war or incitement to violence or the commission of a criminal offense; prevent the promotion of racial, national, and religious hatred or discrimination.”

The Law on Electronic Communications that governs electronic communications and potentially net neutrality, until a few years ago, included a provision:

"The operator is obliged, at the request of the Agency or on its own initiative, with the prior consent of the Agency, to block access to certain numbers and services when justified in cases of fraud or misuse."

The relevant provision was abolished by the decision of the Constitutional Court of Montenegro, published in the Official Gazette of Montenegro on August 23, 2019, as it was deemed unconstitutional.

This indicator assesses a Medium Risk to Media Pluralism since the regulatory safeguards to guarantee net neutrality are not sufficient or adequate.

Score: 3.5 out of 6 = Medium Risk (58%)

 

NET NEUTRALITYDescriptionYesNoNAMD
Does national law address net neutrality directly or indirectly?This question aims to determine whether net neutrality is regulated by domestic law in any way; it also aims to reflect any agreement between countries, as in the EU and countries that are part of the Council of Europe.0.5
Does national law contain norms that prohibit blocking of websites or content online?This question determines the degree to which a country’s net neutrality norms prevent blocking, one of the key components of a robust net neutrality framework0
Does national law contain norms that prohibit throttling of services or content provided online?This question determines the degree to which a country’s net neutrality norms prevent throttling, one of the key components of a robust net neutrality framework1
Does national law contain norms that prohibit zero-rating and/or paid prioritization?This question determines the degree to which a country’s net neutrality norms prevent zero-rating (of which paid prioritization is a common form), one of the key components of a robust net neutrality framework0
Where net neutrality is protected by law, does the legal framework recognize any exceptions, e.g. for reasonable network management?This question establishes when reasonable limits are placed on net neutrality protections versus other limits that may undermine its effectiveness.1
Norms that prohibit or limit zero-rating are successfully implemented: Paid prioritization does not take place.This question aims to flesh out the extent to which paid prioritization occurs in practice despite its prohibition in law; a number of countries with ostensibly strong zero-rating protections experience this phenomenon. This indicator may shed light on the degree of difference between law and practices on the ground0
Norms that prohibit or limit zero-rating are successfully implemented: No other forms of zero-rating take place.Same as above0
Norms are successfully implemented: Blocking and/or throttling do not take place.This question seeks to determine how the legal framework in place to protect net neutrality operates in practice with respect to blocking and throttling0
Are there regulatory or other entities charged with monitoring and enforcing net neutrality protections?This question highlights whether there are authorities charged with enforcing net neutrality protections 1
Have sanctions been imposed for violations of net neutrality protections where these exist?This question may illustrate the extent to which violations of net neutrality norms are taken seriously as a matter of rule of law and political will0
Are the enforcement mechanisms in place to identify and respond to net neutrality violations viewed as effective?This question shows the extent to which net neutrality norms actually achieve their goals 0
Total (Mean of L-e und L-I sub-indicators)                3.5

 

 

 

Gender Imbalance in the Media Industry

Result: Medium Risk

This indicator assesses the representation of women in news media, focusing on relevant newsroom policies and the share of women in management positions.

Why?

The overall risk of gender disbalance in Montenegrin media is medium. There is no publicly available information that any relevant commercial or public media has a unique policy dealing with gender equality. While there are several studies of attacks against women in Montenegro, no special study was made to identify the ratio of attacks on journalists based on gender. Less than one-third of media owners in the MOM sample are women, while over 43% hold managerial positions. However, just six percent of the MOM sampled media have women editors-in-chief.

Female experts are also highly underrepresented in informative and political programs and articles in Montenegrin media. Only 26% of all media content came from a female source, and women were invited to speak in expert capacities around three times less than their male colleagues.

Score: 2.25 Medium Risk

LOW (1)MEDIUM (2)HIGH (3)
12.1Do the leading news media in your country have a policy aiming at a balanced representation of women in the newsroom?
Most leading news media have a gender equality policy or other kinds of self-regulatory measures to make sure that there is adequate representation of women in the newsrooms and in management positions. Moreover, there are mechanisms at place to make sure women in the newsroom don’t encounter harassment or discrimination.Some news media have a gender equality policy or other kinds of self-regulatory measures to make sure that there is adequate representation of women in the newsrooms and in management positions. In these news media, there are mechanisms at place to make sure women in the newsroom don’t encounter harassment or discrimination.There is no gender equality policy in the newsrooms assessed, or they are not effective, leading to discrimination and harassment of female journalists.
12.2Are women journalists subject to harassment or online/ offline violence in your country?
The working environment of women journalists is safe, harassment online or offline is not common, sufficient safeguards are in place.Both men and women are harassed to a similar extent, (physical) violence against female journalists is not common.Cases of violence are reported and harassment of women journalists is common in the country, with many known and reported cases. Women are considered to be more targeted by harassment and violence than men.
12.3

What is the share of women among owners of leading news media?

  • VALUE TV: 2 out of 8 (25%)
  • VALUE Radio: 4 out 6 (66.67%)
  • VALUE Print: 1 out of 4 (25%)
  • VALUE Online: 1 out 9 (11.11%)

Average of VALUES: 31.95%

40 percent or moreBetween 39 and 30 percentLess than 30 percent
12.4

What is the share of women among founders of news media?

  • VALUE TV: Missing Data
  • VALUE Radio: Missing Data
  • VALUE Print: Missing Data
  • VALUE Online: Missing Data

Average of VALUES: Missing Data

40 percent or moreBetween 39 and 30 percentLess than 30 percent
12.5

What is the share of women amongst top managers of news media (such as the CEO)?

  • VALUE TV: 5 out of 12 (41.67%)
  • VALUE Radio: 5 out 11 (45.46%)
  • VALUE Print: 2 out of 4 (50%)
  • VALUE Online: 4 out of 11 (36.37%)

Average of VALUES: 43.38%

40 percent or moreBetween 39 and 30 percentLess than 30 percent
12.6

What is the share of women in key editorial positions in the newsroom (such as leading editors or the editor-in-chief )?

  • VALUE TV: 2 out of 12 (16.67%)
  • VALUE Radio: 0 out 11 (0%)
  • VALUE Print: 0 out 11 (0%)
  • VALUE Online: 1 out of 11 (9.09%)

Average of VALUES: 6.44%

40 percent or moreBetween 39 and 30 percentLess than 30 percent
12.7

What is the share of women in key (board) positions in the newsroom (meaning non-editorial management positions, such as chief financial officer, head of sales and marketing, etc.)?

Missing Data

40 percent or moreBetween 39 and 30 percentLess than 30 percent

Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom(2022): Monitoring Media Pluralism in the Digital Era Accessed in November